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3. Enforcing Legal 
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Violation of Privacy
Associate Professor Inger Marie Sunde*
3.1. Topic
By the year 2000 the problem of sexual abuse images of children on the 
Internet had become well known and initiatives of global reach were taken 
in order to prevent it. A result of these efforts was that most national juris-
dictions implemented criminally sanctioned prohibitions against produc-
tion and trade, effectively creating a worldwide ban on the material. Still, 
more  than a decade  later,  such  images  continue  to  be available  on the 
Internet, not only because of the steady production of new material, but 
also because adequate mechanisms for their removal or suppression have 
not been implemented. 
A main point of this paper is that the illegal material represents an ongo-
ing  violation  of  the  child’s  right  to  private  life,  as  laid  down  in  the 
European Convention of Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) Article 8 ‘right to 
respect for … private … life’.1 It gives cause to question whether the State 
has an obligation to implement filters on the Internet in order to secure 
the child’s  right to private life,  as per the positive  obligation emanating 
from Article 8.1 in conjunction with Article 1. The latter problem can also 
be phrased as concerning the enforcement of criminal law on the Internet, 
* Inger Marie Sunde is Associate Professor (Phd.), at the Norwegian Police University 
College, Research Department. Sunde has a law degree from the University in Oslo 
(1987), and Ll.M at Harvard Law School (1992). After several years as Senior Pub-
lic Prosecutor she returned to academia and completed her doctoral thesis (Phd.) at 
the University in Oslo (2010), on the topic ‘Confiscation by Automation’ (‘Auto-
matisert inndragning’). Complex 3/2011, Norway.
1 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 14 November 1950 (CETS 005); see also the UN Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, Article 17. 
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in particular whether the State has a positive obligation to carry out such 
enforcement.
3.2. The proposition of this paper, background and 
structure
Establishing  a  criminally  sanctioned  prohibition  against  the  production 
and  trade  in  sexual  abuse  material  of  children  (alas,  around  2000  still 
referred to as ‘child pornography’) has been an important aim of the inter-
national  preventive  strategy.  A ban had to be implemented on national 
level and it was a common understanding that the exchange of files on the 
Internet gave special  cause for  concern,  because it was more difficult  to 
prevent than the older forms of the illegal material. A passage from the pre-
amble of the UN Optional Protocol to the Child Convention illustrates 
the problem paradigm at the time: 
‘The States Parties to the present Protocol … Concerned about the grow-
ing availability of child pornography on the Internet and other evolving 
technologies,  and recalling  the  International  Conference  on Combating 
Child Pornography on the Internet, held in Vienna in 1999, in particular 
its conclusion calling for the worldwide criminalization of the production, 
distribution, exportation, transmission, importation, intentional possession 
and  advertising  of  child  pornography,  and  stressing  the  importance  of 
closer cooperation and partnership between Governments and the Internet 
industry’.2
The Cybercrime Convention of 23 November 2001 (CETS 185) stands 
out because it explicitly calls for the criminalization of the material in elec-
tronic form.3 The obligation is laid down in Article 9 ‘Offences related to 
2 Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale 
on Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 25 May 2000.
3 This is not the place for an exhaustive list of sources. However, as regards the EU 
(at  that  time)  one  could  mention  the  Framework  Decision  on Combating the 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography (2004/68/2004), and that 
the Council of Europe crowned its efforts some years later with the adoption of the 
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse, 25 October 2007 (CETS 201), which in the preamble says: ‘Observing that 
the sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children have grown to worrying propor-
tions at both national and international level, in particular as regards the increased 
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child pornography’ (sic!) which mentions the use of ‘computer system’ and 
‘computer  data  storage  media’  as  requisites  for  illegal  dealings  with the 
material.  The purpose  is  to  ensure  that  there  is  no  lacunae in  national 
criminal  law  just  because  of  the  non-physical  nature  of  the  material. 
According  to  the  principle  of  legality,  criminal  provisions  cannot  be 
applied by analogy,  and the prevailing thought was that the concept of 
‘object’ in criminal law was associated with physical matter. Hence, digital 
objects had to be specifically mentioned in the criminal provision. Today 
the physical—electronic (digital) duality seems largely to have lost relev-
ance to this interpretative issue, but it is also less important now given that 
the criminal  code  of  many jurisdictions  has  been amended in order  to 
ensure that digital objects are covered.4 
The principal  motivation for the worldwide ban has been to create a 
safer environment for children at risk of sexual abuse.5 The concern is not 
limited to children who are sexually exploited in the production of  the 
abusive material, but extends also to include children who become at risk 
due to adult usage of such material. Of course, the act of physical sexual 
abuse has been recognized as a crime and punished. However, the general 
preventative effect has not been sufficiently strong. Hence, a comprehens-
ive ban which turns the sexual abuse material into illegal contraband per se 
(as having no legal value) is an important additional means to protect chil-
dren  from abuse.  By  criminalizing  production,  distribution,  marketing, 
acquisition and possession of such material, additional clout is put behind 
the efforts to quell a demand that puts children at risk. That the market of 
offer and demand creates risk of abuse in both ends of the trade is noted in 
item 93 of the Explanatory report to the Cybercrime Convention:
use by both children and perpetrators of information and communication technolo-
gies (ICTs), and that preventing and combating such sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse of children require international co-operation.’ 
4 For a discussion of the concept of ‘object’  in Norwegian criminal law, see Inger 
Marie Sunde ‘Automatisert inndragning’ (‘Confiscation by Automation’), doctoral 
thesis,  Complex 3/2011,  Norway; and by the same author ‘Rettshåndhevelse  på 
Internett’ (‘Confiscation of Duplicate Files on the Internet’), Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Kriminalvidenskab 3/2011, pp. 245-266. 
5 In addition, the contravention of public morality played a role; a concern which 
makes the ban of child abuse material related to the general ban on adult material. 
To some extent this confuses the whole idea of why a separate prohibition is neces-
sary with regard to material depicting children.
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‘It is widely believed that such material and online practices, such as the 
exchange of ideas, fantasies and advice among paedophiles, play a role in 
supporting, encouraging and facilitating sexual offences against children.’ 
But, the comprehensive ban has not created a preventive effect strong 
enough to curtail the problem. This is unsurprising in light of the huge 
profits  involved in criminal business of this kind. Moreover,  the risk of 
prosecution may seem low in light of Internet anonymity and the troubles 
of localizing perpetrators across jurisdictions. 
In my view one may criticize a crime prevention strategy which mainly 
concentrates on personal prosecution, for having major shortcomings with 
respect to measures aimed at destructing or suppressing the illegal material. 
I argue that the State has a positive obligation to block the material on the 
Internet. The structure of the proposition is as follows:
• The criminally sanctioned prohibition of the material is justified 
not only in order to reduce the risk of sexual abuse of children. In 
fact, the prohibition is necessary already for the sole reason that 
exposure of the children on the images constitutes a violation of 
their right to private life according to the ECHR Article 8. 
• Grave violations of the child’s right to private life must be crimin-
alized and effectively investigated and prosecuted, as per the case 
law relating to the ECHR Article 8. The State has a positive oblig-
ation to secure respect of the right to private life of individuals on 
its’ territory. The vulnerability of the child enhances the strength 
of this obligation. 
• The violation of the child’s right to private life is ongoing for as 
long as the images are available on the Internet. Hence, it goes on 
indeterminably unless effective measures are taken in order to stop 
it. 
• It follows that, personal prosecution and punishment is not suffi-
cient in order to secure the child’s right to private life. Measures 
must also be taken against the availability of the material on the 
Internet. The obligation to do so must be assessed in light of the 
predictability of the problem, whether an obligation would consti-
tute an unreasonable burden on the State, and in light of compet-
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ing interests at stake. Filtering cannot be justified if it jeopardizes 
the fundamental rights of others or the rule of law. 
• On a pragmatic level rules of confiscation may be regarded as a 
suitable means for enforcement of criminal law on the Internet by 
the  use  of  filters.  Confiscation  submits  to  a  formal  procedure 
which observes the rule of law, and the application requires a high 
degree of precision. Confiscation must be declared with regard to 
the illegal files seized by the police in a concrete case, and their 
illegal counterparts (duplicates) on the Internet. Subsequently, the 
decision must be enforced. As regards the illegal material actually 
in possession of  the police,  enforcement  may be carried out by 
destruction  (deletion  of  files  or  physical  destruction  of  storage 
media). As regards the illegal duplicates on the Internet, enforce-
ment may be carried out by making the files unavailable to seekers 
of the material. This requires implementation of filters. National 
ISPs may be ordered to carry out filtering on basis  of regularly 
updated specifications of the confiscated files.
• Enforcement on the Internet of a legal decision to confiscate is a 
suitable measure because it specifically targets the illegal files. The 
measure is transparent and observes the rule of law. The measure 
is also controllable and does not interfere with electronic commu-
nication  in  general.  In  the  absence  of  other  less  intrusive  but 
equally effective means, the conclusion is that the positive obliga-
tion calls for urgent action to introduce such filters on the Inter-
net. 
3.3. Distribution on the Internet and the impact on 
‘private life’
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.6 The 
legal concept of private life is dynamic and must be interpreted not only in 
light of the concrete circumstances of the case, but also in light of general 
trends that permeate society. The question concerns the relevance of com-
puter technology and electronic networks to the interpretation of ‘private 
life’  with regard to sexual  abuse images  on the Internet.  The European 
6 P.G. and J.H. v U.K., no. 44787/98, 25 September 2001 (56).
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Court  of  Human Rights  (‘the Court’)  has  on several  occasions  in cases 
concerning violations  between private  individuals,  emphasized a general 
concern of ‘new communication technologies which make it possible to 
store  and reproduce  personal  data’.  According  to  the  Court  it  requires 
‘increased vigilance in protecting private life’.7
It is common knowledge that distribution in digital network results in 
the proliferation of duplicate files. A computer file cannot, unlike physical 
copies in the form of magazines, paper photos and VHS-cassettes, be trans-
ferred  between  network  nodes  with  the  result  that  a  blank  spot  is  left 
behind at the source point. Transfer creates  copies causing a single file to 
become quickly widespread due to download and redistribution time and 
time again by end users all over the world. The material does not deterior-
ate and vanish over time as do physical copies.
Hence, digital sexual abuse material which is uploaded to the Internet is 
available, in practical terms, forever. To the extent that the material repres-
ents  a  violation  of  the child’s  right  to  privacy,  the  violation continues 
forever, that is, unless measures are taken to remove, suppress or block the 
material. 
The  ever  present  personal  information  on  the  Internet  has  triggered 
thoughts of ‘a right to be forgotten’ as inherent in the right to privacy, 
which, i.a., includes a right to be left alone / in peace. There is a growing 
understanding of the problems of everlasting violations, and of the less pre-
dictable problems of ‘decontextualization’,  that is,  pieces of  information 
taken out of context and put to new and unexpected use to the detriment 
of the individual concerned. Philosopher Viktor Mayer-Schonberger sug-
gests the implementation of new technical measures in order to protect pri-
vacy  against  digitally  caused  problems.  Such  technical  measures  could 
include  making  personal  information  not  automatically  searchable,  and 
expiration dates on computer files.8 Also the 2012 EU proposal for a new 
general  data  protection  regulation  includes  a  provision  concerning  the 
‘Right to be forgotten and to erasure’ (Article 17).9
7 Von Hannover  v  Germany (no.  1),  no.  59320/00,  24  June  2004  (70);  E.S.  v 
Sweden, no. 5786/08, 21 June 2012 (71).
8 ‘The  Virtue  of  Forgetting in the  Digital  Age’,  Viktor  Mayer-Schonberger,  UK, 
2011. 
9 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
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A basic  question is whether  the sexual  abuse material  as such—by its 
mere existence—represents an interference with the child’s right to ‘private 
life’. In K.U. v Finland (2008) (‘K.U.’) the Court held that a false message 
that had been made publicly available on a dating website in the name of a 
12 year old boy, interfered with his right to private life.10 The message 
falsely  exposed him as  being interested in sexual  experiences  with older 
men. 
Sexual  abuse  material  (images)  must  be  considered  to  be  at  least  as 
offensive to the honor and psychological wellbeing of the child as the mes-
sage in ‘K.U.’. Fundamentally the material affects the ‘moral integrity’ of 
the child.11 The case E.S. v Sweden (2012) (‘E.S.’) concerned an instance 
of covert filming of a 14 year old girl while taking a shower at home. The 
Court found that such filming concerned an aspect of the victim’s private 
life and did also make a note of ‘covert filming [which] deeply violated the 
personal identity of the persons concerned’.12
At its core the production and distribution of such material is a betrayal 
of the child’s trust in an adult, or, in a situation without trust, photograph-
ing and distribution add psychological stress to a situation that is already 
deeply humiliating and painful. Finally, the traumatizing effect of the risk 
of exposure later in life must be taken into account. All of these aspects fall 
within the scope of ‘private life’. With respect to children who are identifi-
able from the images one may finally add the violation of the child’s right 
to control its exposure in public.13 The problems that the police has with 
regard to the identification of victims, is not relevant in this respect. What 
matters is whether the child can be identified if the image is exposed to a 
person who knows the child. Against this background it seems safe to con-
clude that the images, as such, cause a violation of Article 8.1. 
Free  Movement  of  such  Data.  25.1.2012  Com  (2012)  11  final.  See  also 
‘Økosystemeffekten—Om personvernet i sosiale medier’ by the present author in 
Lov og Rett no. 1/2013, Oslo, pp. 85-102. 
10 K.U. v Finland, no. 2872/02, 2 December 2008.
11 Ibid., (41). 
12 ‘E.S.’ (67) (full reference in fn. 8).
13 Von Hannover v Germany (no. 2), nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, 7 February 2012 
(95) ‘The Court reiterates that the concept of private life extends to aspects relating 
to personal identity, such as a person’s name, photo, or physical and moral integ-
rity.’
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A glance at Norwegian jurisprudence may be useful to this part of the 
analysis. In a landmark case from 2002 the Norwegian Supreme Court had 
the following to say about the character of the violation:
‘In addition to the enormously widespread distribution which is the result 
of making the images available on the Internet, it is not practically possible  
to delete them.  Children who over years  have suffered sexual  abuse may 
therefore experience that  they are recognized for years  to come. This  is 
properly to be regarded as  a perpetual violation… One has to take into 
account the risk that others may be exposed to the images, which consti-
tutes  a considerable extra burden of  the victim later in life.’14 (emphasis 
added)
The  statement  emphasizes  that  (i)  distribution  in  digital  networks  is 
qualitatively different from distribution of physical copies; (ii) distribution 
on the Internet results in a perpetual violation of the child’s right to pri-
vacy; and (iii) the traumatizing effect caused by knowledge of the distribu-
tion constitutes in itself a violation of psychological integrity. 
Remembering the need of  increased vigilance of protection of private 
life in light of new communication technology, the Norwegian Supreme 
Court captured very clearly the added impact of new technology to the 
violation of private life. It did so in a spirit living up to the scope and pur-
pose of Article 8. On the assumption that the statement gives an adequate 
expression of the violation in light of Article 8, I proceed to an examina-
tion of the proposition outlined above.
3.4. The two dimensions of the positive obligation 
of the State
3.4.1. The obligation to provide for adequate legal 
protection
It is well established that the State does not fulfill its obligations under the 
ECHR merely by abstaining from interfering with the rights and freedoms 
of the convention. In addition, the State must ‘secure’ that the rights may 
effectively  be  enjoyed  by  individuals  within  its  jurisdiction  (Article  1: 
14 Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
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‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms [of the 
Convention]’). The obligation may amount to actively taking steps which 
protect individuals against violation of their rights and freedoms by other 
individuals. 
The positive obligation may call for action both with regard to provid-
ing for adequate legislation and with regard to taking physical steps neces-
sary  in  order  to  make  the  legal  protection  of  the  right  effective.  The 
approach  is  that  the  State  must  have  adequate  preventive  structures  in 
place. It is not a requirement that the State prevents every single instance 
of abuse.
First,  the question is  whether  the obligation  to provide  for  adequate 
legal protection has been fulfilled. The existence of a criminally sanctioned 
ban  against  production  and  dealings  in  sexual  abuse  material  must  be 
regarded as a bottom line in this respect. As concerns Norway such a ban is 
laid down in the Criminal Code section 204a.15 
Next, the question is whether the law provides for means to make the 
protection  afforded  by  the  substantive  criminal  law  provision  effective. 
This is a matter of imposing an adequate reaction to the offence. Personal 
prosecution and punishment s is necessary, but can hardly be regarded as 
sufficient in relation to the problem at hand, because the reaction has no 
effect on the illegal material. The violation of private life continues regard-
less of punishment of perpetrators. Therefore, the law must also provide 
for measures that lead to deletion or destruction of the illegal material. An 
option that immediately comes to mind is to react with confiscation. As far 
as contraband is concerned, confiscation serves to eliminate the material as 
a problem by ensuring its destruction. Whether computer files can be sub-
ject to confiscation is  an important question.  It raises  the interpretative 
issue earlier mentioned, namely, whether the legal concept of ‘object’  in 
criminal law extends so far as to encompass digital phenomena. This mat-
ter of interpretation of national legal rules will not be pursued here, save 
for two remarks: 
First, as far as Norwegian law is concerned, the interpretative issue is not 
a problem. The concept of ‘object’ comprises digital phenomena, provided 
that they can be specified and identified.16 It means that section 35 of the 
15 The Norwegian Civil Criminal Code of 22 May 1902 no. 10. 
16 See references in fn. 5. 
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Criminal Code concerning confiscation of objects can be applied to com-
puter files in the following instances: (i) Files which have been produced 
by a crime (digital files resulting from videomaking etc.); (ii) files which 
have been involved in a crime (been acquired or are in somebody’s posses-
sion), and (iii) files which have (or were meant to) serve(d) as tools in order 
to commit a crime (source files for distribution on the Internet). The situ-
ation seems to be largely similar in Denmark and Sweden.17 
However, with regard to jurisdictions where confiscation of computer 
files is a problem, the State has cause to consider the necessity of improv-
ing the law in order to provide for effective legal protection of private life. 
The positive obligation is a legal norm which similarly to other legal norms 
extends  into  the digital  realm,  as  is  the case for  instance of  substantive 
criminal law, the law of contracts and of copyright law. It is reasonable to 
assume that, when certain material is legally defined as contraband, there is 
an obligation also to enforce the law with respect to the illegal material. A 
criminal ban which is not backed by effective investigation and sanction 
does not live up to the standard of the ECHR. This is emphasized by the 
European Court of Human Rights especially with respect to rights of the 
child, because a child is vulnerable and entirely dependent on protection 
afforded to it by others.18 
Secondly, the legal situation on this point (i.e. confiscation and destruc-
tion of  illegal  material),  is  crucial  in order  to secure legal  protection of 
private life, at least to the extent that private life has been shown to have 
been violated, through the discovery of illegal material in an investigation. 
Other  types  of  contraband,  such as  narcotics  or  weapons,  are  routinely 
seized by the police, then confiscated and destructed. Previously, when the 
Internet was perceived as a place somewhere else than here, a plea for con-
fiscation of the physical storage media which contained the illegal images, 
was regarded as adequate. One simply did not pay any attention to the fact 
that the illegal material might be located in the network as well. 
This  situation has changed radically.  Internet  has  become an integral 
part of daily life and to most people a life off line is neither practical nor 
desirable.  The main technological  drivers  have been the development of 
‘cloud computing’ (web 2.0) and ubiquitous wireless Internet. The result is 
17 Id. 
18 ‘K.U.’ (46); ‘E.S.’ (58).
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a shift of focus from usage of the physical computer to usage of informa-
tion  and functionality  online.  Given  the  circumstances,  confiscation  of 
physical storage media has very limited effect in order to end the violation 
of private life caused by the illegal files. The illegal digital content may be 
dealt with irrespective of the physical equipment which is at one’s disposal, 
because it is  stored and traded on the Internet.  The illegal  files  as such 
therefore become the focal point of interest as potential objects of confisca-
tion. And as has already been explained, confiscation may be applied in so 
far as the illegal digital files can be individualized and specified as (digital) 
objects. The upshot is that the plea for confiscation must specify the illegal 
files  that have been detected in the seized material.  Such specification is 
routinely provided for in a computer forensic report which is enclosed in 
the case documents. The report is subject to contradiction by the defend-
ant and produced at trial together with a collection of files that give a fair 
description of the illegal content of the case. Hence, a procedurally sound 
basis for an exact plea of confiscation of specified files is already provided 
for,  by ordinary practice in these cases.  Confiscation adds an important 
reaction (in addition to personal punishment) without creating new invest-
igation themes or costs.  Hence,  it makes better use of resources  already 
invested in the case. 
3.4.2. The obligation to take physical action
The issue  to  be discussed  here  concerns  the positive  obligation  to  take 
physical action in order to protect private life from the violation caused by 
the illegal computer files. This is not a question of having to take physical 
preventive measures not knowing exactly when, where or against whom a 
violation may occur.  Rather, the approach is that the obligation to take 
physical action may lie in extension of the application of the criminal ban 
against specific illegal computer files and the decision to confiscate them. 
In other words, the issue concerns practical enforcement of a judicial sen-
tence ordering confiscation of specified illegal computer files. Enforcement 
is necessary in order to secure that the right to private life is not merely 
theoretical, but also real and effective.19 
19 The obligation to take physical  action is established, i.a.,  in Osman v U.K.,  no. 
23452/94, 28 October 1998 (prevent physical assault and threat to life);  and in 
M.C. v Bulgaria no. 39272/98, 4 December 2003 (effective investigation of date 
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Obviously, material that has been taken under control by the police can 
be destroyed. Destruction relieves the police of a major storage problem, 
but has no effect in terms of reducing the violation of private life which 
continues on the Internet. What really counts is that the illegal duplicates  
which circulate on the Internet are blocked. This has to be achieved by the 
use of filters. Implementation of filters on the Internet takes the form of 
physical action by the State. Whether the positive obligation of the State 
involves this measure must be determined pursuant to an appraisal of all 
the  interests  put  at  stake  by  such  an  action.  This  is  the  issue  to  be 
examined in the next part. 
3.5. Implementation of Internet filters as part of 
the positive obligation
3.5.1. Introduction to the legal assessment
The positive obligation to take physical action in order to secure the right 
to private life is not unconditional, and a rather broad assessment must be 
applied in order to determine the issue. According to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights an obligation to take physical prevent-
ive action requires as a minimum, that the problem is known so it is pos-
sible to prevent it. Furthermore, the State has considerable leeway—a mar-
gin of  appreciation—with respect  to choice  of  preventive  strategies  and 
allocation of financial resources to crime prevention. A positive obligation 
to implement filters that enforce confiscation of illegal duplicate files, must 
as a minimum require that the measure is reasonably effective in relation to 
its aim, and it must not constitute an unreasonable burden on the State. 
Finally, the fundamental rights of others and the rule of law must not be 
jeopardized. In the present case the general Internet users’ right to private 
life and freedom of speech seems to be of relevance. In addition, there is 
the right of the ISP to conduct its business, as per Article 1 ‘Protection of 
property’ of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention. 
To my knowledge the Court has not tried a case concerning Internet fil-
tering.  But incidentally,  two judgments  concerning filtering in order  to 
protect intellectual property rights (‘IP-rights’) have been handed down by 
rape).
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the European Court of Justice (‘the ECJ’), i.e., the cases of ‘Scarlet’ (ISP) 
and  of  ‘Netlog’  (Internet  host).20 The  cases  are  helpful  to  inform  the 
present analysis about the rights and interests involved, because the ECJ 
applied a broad assessment much similar to the assessment of the positive 
obligation. 
3.5.2. Knowledge of the problem
The first question concerns the knowledge requirement. It addresses the 
necessity of having sufficient knowledge about the violation in order to be 
able to take relevant preventive action. The condition requires more than 
having a mere general knowledge of a problem, because the police cannot, 
and ought not, be present everywhere all the time. In other words, the con-
dition means that it is necessary to have knowledge of  a concrete criminal  
problem which can be prevented. 
In pursuit of the proposition outlined in part 2, the knowledge require-
ment is fulfilled simply as a function of the confiscation of files. By invest-
igation, specification and confiscation of concrete illegal files, knowledge is 
established about specific illegal files. This is precise knowledge of a con-
crete criminal problem. The only assumption of a general nature is that 
duplicates are available on the Internet. Longtime experience shows that 
this  is  highly  likely.  Often  the forensic  analysis  verifies  the  assumption 
through  automatic  file  recognition,  thus  creating  knowledge also  of  the 
existence of duplicates on the Internet. Sadly, even in cases where the sus-
pect  claims that files  s/he has produced have not been uploaded to the 
Internet, experience regularly shows that they nevertheless become avail-
able  as  time  goes  by.21 Hence,  the  knowledge  requirement  must  be 
regarded as fulfilled. 
20 Case C-70/10, 24 November 2011 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, 
compositeurs  et  éditeurs  SCRL  (SABAM);  Case  C-360/10,  13  February  2012 
SABAM v Netlog NV. 
21 Information  received  from Kriminalpolitisentralen  (Kripos),  i.e.,  the  Norwegian 
National  Criminal  Intelligence  Service,  which is the central  police authority  for 
assistance to local police in special cases, i.a., child abuse and child abuse material. 
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3.5.3. The effect of concrete knowledge to other parts 
of the assessment
In my opinion the high degree of knowledge concerning the availability of 
concrete illegal files on the Internet has an impact on the margin of appre-
ciation of  the State with respect  to preventive  strategic  choices  and the 
allocation of budgets. It is reasonable that the State must have wide meas-
ure to determine preventive strategies against problems of a more general 
or less  predictive nature.  Often, it  is  not even clear  whether  a problem 
should be addressed primarily as a criminal problem or as a social or health 
problem, as for instance is the case with narcotics. But the illegal duplicates 
are characterized by being identical so they can be blocked wherever they 
appear. Nothing is unpredictable about them. They also concern a matter 
of ‘most intimate aspects of private life’ which narrows the margin allowed 
to the State.22
It seems unreasonable that the State  despite this knowledge should have 
leeway to  ignore  the illegal  material.  A comparable  situation would be, 
hypothetically,  that  the  State  could  ignore  narcotics  discovered  on  the 
roadside (for a courier to pick it up). In such a situation the State doubt-
lessly  has  an obligation to confiscate  and destruct  the illegal  substances 
(except  for  tactical  reasons  during  an  investigation).  The  known illegal 
material on the Internet is a similar problem. To ignore it would amount 
to neglect of the State’s obligation to secure a safe environment to its cit-
izens,  and be a deviation from the global  long term preventive  strategy 
with respect to child abuse material.
However, implementation of filters necessarily incurs costs, a burden to 
be borne by the State, the ISPs or both. According to the doctrine of the 
positive obligation, a measure cannot be unreasonably burdensome and the 
State can also chose how to allocate funds between alternative measures. 
This means that it cannot be obliged to implement filters if other suitable 
but less expensive measures are available. 
A calculation of the financial costs of such filtering is beyond the scope 
of this paper. At present I only want to draw attention to the fact that fil-
ters not only represent costs, as such enforcement of the law may also lead 
to certain  cost  reductions.  Of course,  to determine the parameters  that 
22 ‘E.S.’ (58).
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should be taken into account is notoriously difficult, but at least the fol-
lowing points seem relevant: 
• Blocking of illegal files  does not add costs to the investigation and 
prosecution of  a  criminal  case.  Blocking  is  mere  enforcement of 
decisions made in that case. 
• Confiscation and blocking puts  a decisive end to the treatment of 
the illegal files within a particular jurisdiction. As a result one does 
not have to legally deal with known files in the future. This is an 
improvement  as  compared  to  today’s  situation  where  the  same 
illegal files are dealt with over and over again by the law enforcing 
system, because there is no final authoritative decision as to their 
illegality. By confiscation they are  conclusively dealt with and the 
decision is enforced in the filters. This approach makes better use 
of resources, thus releasing resources which can be better used on 
cases  which  involve  newly  produced  illegal  material,  instead  of 
repeatedly being burdened with the old material. 
• Blocking may easily  be  enhanced by international  cooperation on 
basis of the global ban of such material. The law enforcement can 
exchange  the identities  of  the illegal  files  between jurisdictions, 
identities  which in turn are fed to filters  run by national  ISPs. 
This lives up to the aim and spirit of the international conventions 
mentioned in part 2.
As regards  the suitability of filters with respect to the goal to be achieved, 
one must first of all agree on the goal which is to be achieved. In my opin-
ion the goal is not to solve the total problem of sexual abuse material on 
the Internet. The goal is limited to complete the task which was embarked 
upon by initiating investigation of a concrete case; in other words, to com-
plete the confiscation of illegal material by enforcing the decision on the 
Internet. Accordingly, the goal is to stop the availability of known illegal 
files in order to end the violation of the right to private life of the child. 
For this purpose the filters must be considered as a very suitable means. 
They identify the illegal files and block them, period. 
One  may  object  that,  still,  the  costs  and  efforts  are  not  worthwhile 
because  the  criminals  can  always  circumvent  preventive  measures.  For 
instance, they can circumvent the identity of the illegal files so they escape 
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the filters. But this contention is misguided, because the criminals cannot 
circumvent  the  identity  of  the files  which  have  been distributed  to  the 
Internet. Criminals can only change the identity of computer files which 
are under their control. Once files have been spread duplicates are made 
and can be caught by the filters. The criminal can ‘reproduce’ files under 
its control with a new identity, but the effort does not have any bearing on 
the duplicates that were spread on the Internet at an earlier stage. Those 
can still be caught by the filters.
But of course, filters are not 100 per cent effective. For instance, crim-
inal trade that takes place in specially encrypted channels may go undetec-
ted. And clearly, the filter infrastructure itself  is vulnerable and must be 
protected against tampering.
3.5.4. The significance of the ECJ-judgments
The mentioned ECJ-judgments concerned an ISP (‘Scarlet’) and a host of 
a social media site (‘Netlog’), both of whom had been imposed with an 
obligation  to  implement  filters  in  order  to  block  pirated  IP-protected 
material on the Internet. Both ‘Scarlet’ and ‘Netlog’ concluded that filter-
ing was in contravention of the prohibition of the E-commerce directive 
against general monitoring of electronic communication. The ECJ’s assess-
ment was very broad, taking account of all rights and interests involved. 
However, it also showed that the result is largely dependent on the facts of 
the case. Some points contribute to the present analysis:
First, the ECJ noted that the entire financial burden had been placed on 
the ISP/Internet host.  It made the filtering scheme basically  unbalanced 
and unfair. This has a bearing to present analysis because it is not obvious 
that the Internet business  shall  bear the total  burden when the measure 
concerns crime prevention. To the contrary, enforcement of legal decisions 
in the course of crime prevention is usually financed by the State. So, this 
could be different in the present analysis. 
Secondly, the ECJ-cases concerned protection of IP-rights. Such rights 
can be protected also by other means than filtering, at least in the sense 
that the IP-right holder can be economically compensated, for instance by 
donations over the national budget or by the imposition of a levy. This 
option is not available with regard to the rights of the child. The European 
Court of Human Rights has emphasized that effective crime prevention is 
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necessary in this respect and that economic compensation alone does not 
suffice.23 So, also this is different in the present analysis. 
Thirdly,  the ECJ noted that the filters  put the fundamental  rights  of 
Internet users in general in jeopardy, i.a., because the traffic on their IP-ad-
dresses could be monitored. The rights at stake concern privacy and free-
dom of speech. This point addresses exactly the aforementioned condition 
that a measure under the positive obligation must not put other funda-
mental rights in jeopardy. But, on a closer look it seems doubtful that the 
filtering scheme of ‘Scarlet’ and ‘Netlog’ was properly designed, because, if 
it had, those rights would not have been put at risk. A positive obligation 
to implement filters, which have as their purpose to enforce confiscation of 
illegal  files,  must  concern  filters  that  do  precisely  this  and  nothing  else. 
Whether that is the case, depends on technological design and control. 
If it is not possible to design filters that do not collect IP-addresses (or 
other personal data), then, perhaps filters must be ruled out under the pos-
itive obligation. But of course, that would be at the cost of the private life 
of the child, and it is questionable that their rights, which suffer massive 
concrete ongoing violations, should count less than rights which are put at 
stake only theoretically. However, it is doubtful that such accumulation of 
IP-addresses is in fact unavoidable. If the politicians demand development 
of filters that not collect such data, well, then the computer engineers are 
likely to deliver. So, this could also be a point of difference.
The overall conclusion is that the present issue is different to the ECJ-
judgments on very important points, that is, with regard to the nature of 
the protected right, the availability of alternative measures (not available), 
with respect  to  the allocation of  the financial  burden and,  finally,  with 
respect to the design of the filtering scheme. While the judgments are use-
ful in order to inform the present analysis, they also show that when facts 
are different, the outcome of the legal assessment may well be different. 
3.5.5. The control requirement
What remains is to emphasize the necessity of implementing control meas-
ures which guarantee respect of the rule of law. Control measures which 
ensure that the filters are fed only with the identities of the confiscated files 
must be in place. Likewise, there must be a control that ensures that no IP-
23 ‘K.U.’ (46).
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addresses  or  other  personal  data  are  collected  from  the  filters.  This  is 
important because such deviant practice would mean that the filters  are 
used for  another  purpose  than enforcement  of  confiscation,  and would 
lack legal basis. 
On the other hand, a filtering scheme which is designed and implemen-
ted  in  line  with  the  abovementioned  analysis,  will  be  transparent  (the 
illegal files are not secret), controllable and will not impinge on other fun-
damental rights and interests. 
3.6. Conclusion
It is time to arrive at a conclusion. The upshot is that with some caveats 
for the design of the filtering scheme and the costs involved, the State has a 
positive obligation to implement filters which block known illegal files. 
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